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Abstract 
The transformations in the worldwide division of labour brought about by globalisation and 
technological change have shown an unintended negative effect, particularly evident in advanced 
economic systems: uneven spatial distribution of wealth and rising within-country inequality. 
Although the latter has featured prominently in recent academic and policy debates, in this paper we 
argue that the relevance of connectivity (here proxied by foreign capital investments, FDI) for regional 
economic development is still underestimated and suffers from a nation-biased perspective. As a 
consequence, the relationship between the spatial inequality spurred by the global division of labour 
and the changes in the structural advantages of regions remains to be fully understood in its 
implications for economic growth, territorial resilience and industrial policy. Furthermore, even 
though connectivity entails bi-directional links – i.e. with regions being simultaneously receivers and 
senders – attractiveness to foreign capital has long been at the centre of policy attention whilst 
internationalisation through investment abroad has been disregarded, and sometimes purposely 
ignored, in regional development policy agendas. We use three broad-brushed European case-studies 
to discuss some guiding principles for a place-sensitive regional policy eager to integrate the 
connectivity dimension in pursuing local economic development and territorial equity. 
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1. Introduction 
“Investment policymaking is getting more complex, more divergent and more uncertain.” (UNCTAD, 
2017, xi). Unprecedentedly fast technological change – currently in the midst of a shift from the 
mature ICT revolution to a new, still undefined, technological paradigm – coupled with the 
intensification of globally integrated production and innovation networks (GPNs) and value chains 
(GVCs), have spurred the need to place regional growth and development in a truly open and 
interdependent framework. Despite substantial progress made by academic research at the 
intersection of international business studies and economic geography in identifying the subnational 
dimension of these structural transformations, rethinking regional development in such a perspective 
still presents a number of challenges, particularly in terms of policy design. 
In this paper we maintain that it is essential to extend the debate on connectivity – i.e. the exposure 
of a place to the inflows and outflows of assets, knowledge, capabilities and expertise from and 
towards the rest of the world, here exemplified by global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows – from 
the nation-state level, traditionally conceived in theory and policy, to a more fine-grained subnational 
geography consisting of regions, cities, and industrial clusters, thus embedding inter- and intra-
regional scales of analysis. Such a geographical scale is in fact the relevant one for unveiling the 
inequality effect on growth and economic development spurred by globalisation and technological 
processes, which change absolute and relative advantages of territories. At the same time, it is 
paramount to take simultaneously on board, particularly in the policy domain, both directions of 
connectivity: territorial attractiveness towards foreign capital inflows – and the dynamic processes of 
specialisation and diversification able to reconfigure economic and institutional location advantages 
– and outward investments from locally operating firms, which can contribute in various ways to the 
re-orientation of the local industrial structure and economic functionality.  
Different geographical scales of analysis and the interdependence of inward and outward FDI flows 
translate into the challenges of greater complexity and heterogeneity of place-specific business 
strategies and development policies. To tackle such challenges it is necessary to adopt new policy 
principles emerging from current regional economic development debates, which can help managing 
the rapid evolution of location advantages and counterbalancing the diverse impact of globalisation 
on the fate of people, firms and regions.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first summarises some broad trends of 
connectivity through global FDI, considers its economic geography and territorial equity implications, 
and then reviews the theoretical rationale behind current internationalisation policies. Section 3 
provides a broad-brushed picture of the subnational geography of FDI flows in Europe, and focuses on 
three regional case-studies – the three “Celtic Tigers” of Southern & Eastern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales – by summarising their connectivity position and policy approaches towards passive and active 
internationalisation through FDI. Section 4 discusses implications and general principles for place-
sensitive regional policies eager to integrate connectivity in pursuing local economic development and 
territorial equity, and indicates research lines in progress, whilst Section 5 presents some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. FDI today: global shifts and local outcomes 
2.1 Globalisation through FDI and geography  
The relevance of FDI in the world economy has grown relentlessly in the last three decades. FDI stocks 
as a percentage of world’s gross domestic product went from around 10% in 1990 to around 35% in 
2016 (UNCTAD, 2017). Latest estimates indicate that, in 2012, multinational enterprises (MNEs) were 
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more than 100,000, and that the number of their affiliates was close to 1 million (Javidan and Bowen, 
2013): their exponential growth has been increasingly fed by small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), 
either born-global, or growing into MNEs. The geography of world FDI recipients and investors has 
also widened (UNCTAD, 2015, 2017): the share of developing and emerging economies on global FDI 
flows has gone steadily up, in 2014 accounting for more than a half (55%) of world total inflows 
(though down to 41% in 2016), and around 40% of total outflows (down to under 30% in 2016). The 
majority of these cross-border flows span neighbouring economies, rather than being genuinely global 
transactions. This global regionalism is characterised by the slicing up and recombination of GPNs and 
GVCs in which establishments and groups of activities are ‘unbundled’ (Baldwin, 2011) primarily across 
groups of neighbouring economic systems (e.g. Rugman, 2005; Guy, 2009, 2015; UNCTAD, 2017).  
In addition, around two-thirds of global FDI stocks are now in service industries. Even considering such 
a share as somehow inflated by industry classification methods in FDI data (UNCTAD, 2017), it is 
undeniable that the change in FDI composition reflects the growing complementarity between 
manufacturing and service industries. The shift to Industry 4.0 – the current industrial revolution 
based on automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies – together with the connected 
modularity and separability of production stages in GPNs and GVCs allowed by technological progress, 
are rendering industry boundaries more and more blurred: the new knowledge economy is more likely 
to be classifiable in terms of activities and functions, and so it is the notion of comparative advantage.  
In the light of these transformations, the geographical scope to analyse globalisation through FDI 
needs reconsideration. Indeed, particularly in policy perspectives, firms’ ownership advantages are 
still deemed to be rooted in the competitive advantages of the country of origin, whilst the attraction 
forces pulling MNE activities coincide with the location advantages of the country of destination. In 
thinking of the geographical dimension of both determinants and effects of MNE activity and 
investment, the nation-state has been seen, at least until recently, as the natural unit of observation. 
Besides, traditional economic theory has mostly implied that the impact of globalisation – through 
flows of capitals, knowledge, and people – would automatically spread technological capabilities and 
growth opportunities, promoting income convergence across and, even more so, within nation-states.  
Both Marshallian and Jacobian theories of agglomeration predict an impact of geography on growth. 
The major function of geographical space is that of facilitating learning, knowledge flows and the 
building up of capabilities among co-located economic actors. However, despite its emphasis on the 
relevance of knowledge, much of the vast literature on agglomeration economies and spillover 
mechanisms has been largely unconcerned with connectivity through FDI, overlooking the fact that 
the dynamics of local specialisation – and thus change in comparative advantages – may stem also 
from the establishment of such extra-local linkages, which play an increasingly important role in 
preventing regional stagnation and in spurring diversity conducive to growth (e.g. Boschma and 
Iammarino, 2009; Iammarino and McCann, 2013). 
The suitability of the nation-state as the archetypal unit of analysis for thinking of connectivity and 
tackling the effects of globalisation and FDI has been put in question. The academic debate has moved 
progressively beyond thinking of regional advantages as determined by untraded interdependencies 
(Storper, 1995) within largely national economic and institutional settings. Indeed, regional absolute 
and comparative advantages (disadvantages) – as well as specialisation and diversification processes 
– that used to rest on local production capacity, economies of scale and scope, and resources creating 
virtuous (vicious) circles of innovation, employment and growth, nowadays derive largely from 
interdependencies and relations that are neither localised nor confined within national systems. It has 
been recently shown that the influence of the ‘cluster-of-origin’ is far more important than that of 
the ‘country-of-origin’ in explaining firms’ investment location choices (e.g. Li and Bathelt, 2017; 
Turkina and Van Assche, 2018), and that localised regional and cluster networks affect the shape of 
global urban networks (Bathelt and Li, 2014).  
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The subnational institutional setting is of fundamental importance for connectivity: an open system 
needs open socio-economic institutions, able to manage change and to work in coordination with local 
and non-local actors (Scott and Storper, 2003). Similarly, regional and local governance structures and 
policies – within national frameworks – ought to embed the co-ordination of articulated ‘value and 
actor networks’, both localized and non-spatial, and to pursue the stabilization of different 
expectations and interactions to ensure institutional change for sustainable competitive advantages 
(e.g. Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Bathelt and Glückler, 2014; Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2015). When 
places are discriminated on the basis of such international interdependencies, connectivity becomes 
one of the most important differentiators of growth trajectories behind regional survival and revival 
(Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017; Iammarino et al., 2018b).  
2.2 Connectivity and spatial inequality  
The transformations in the worldwide division of labour, its location, the nature and number of 
players, the interdependence of economic activities and performances, have been accompanied by 
rising within-country inequality, particularly evident in advanced economic areas such as Europe. The 
current wave of globalisation has shown two edges: the spatial hierarchy-reinforcing (divergence) 
effects have proved much stronger than the spatial spread (convergence) effects predicted by 
economic theory on the distribution of benefits and costs of globalisation and technological progress 
(Iammarino et al., 2018a). The combined power of the latter two forces has shown that geographical 
concentration and dispersion of production and innovation can occur simultaneously, giving rise to 
concurrent convergence and divergence patterns depending on the spatial scale of reference. The 
concept of “concentrated dispersion” (Ernst and Kim, 2002) emphasizes precisely stronger 
agglomeration economies within national economic systems, despite the apparently reduced spatial 
stickiness of economic activities across national borders at the global scale.  
The renewed strength of agglomeration forces under globalisation has given prominence to certain 
types of metropolitan regions and cities within each of the world macro-areas, and particularly in 
industrially advanced ones. Some ‘global cities’, displaying particular combinations of economic and 
social openness allied with key hard and soft infrastructures and monopolisation of financial and 
political powers, have acted as key nodes in worldwide-spreading production, technology and trade 
networks (e.g. Sassen, 2001, 2009; Taylor, 2004). They are the primary homes and hosts of major 
knowledge-based MNEs and the true beneficiaries of globalisation, being centres of political influence, 
corporate decision-making and control, knowledge generation and exchange, skills and jobs (e.g. 
Yeung, 2009; McCann and Acs, 2010).  
However, MNEs may search for wide and general purpose technologies and competencies, as well as 
for high levels of sectoral, functional and technical specialisation, thus targeting different types of 
location advantages in combination with those available at home (Jensen and Pedersen, 2011). 
Furthermore, small-sized MNEs and those originating from emergent economies, with narrower 
geographical scope of activities abroad, are likely to display different strategic behaviors and respond 
to diverse attractive factors than truly global corporations operating a stringent control on knowledge 
flows across the firm’s organisation and ownership boundaries (e.g. Grindley and Teece, 1997; 
McCann and Mudambi, 2005; Athreye and Kapur, 2009; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). Connectivity 
through FDI, and integration in GPNs and GVCs, have offered different opportunities for economies of 
scale and scope in production, in R&D and in other economic functions, to a variety of regions and 
industrial clusters, leading to accumulation of capabilities at both geographical ends – i.e. host 
(receiving) and home (sending) regions. Such interregional connections alter the advantages of 
agglomeration in specific places and in particular lines of activity, function and technological 
development, thus reinforcing or broadening the existing patterns of local specialisation (e.g. Cantwell 
and Iammarino, 2000). 
 Within the same countries of these global city-regions and local systems of economic excellence 
championing FDI connectivity in the Global North, there are other cities, regions and industrial clusters 
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facing both tougher international competition and lower (and historically decreasing) nation-state 
protection: many relatively routinized activities and occupations in both manufacturing and services 
industries there located have either become obsolete or moved to the Global South. Such job 
destruction processes often reflect mid- to low- skills, income and management roles: the 
international outsourcing and offshoring of these tasks heavily contribute to greater levels of localised 
job polarisation (e.g. Driffield et al., 2009; Elia et al., 2009; Goos et al., 2009; Kemeny and Rigby, 2012; 
Castellani and Pieri, 2016). The resulting skewed income distributional changes (e.g. Robert-Nicoud, 
2008) tend to favour high- skilled and income groups in industrialised countries – mostly located in 
globally connected city-regions and clusters – along with a wider range of income groups in the 
emerging economies, while the low- and middle-skilled cohorts within advanced economies – 
prominently present in declining and peripheral European regions – face the most difficult transition, 
recently translating into social distress and rising populism (e.g. Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; Rodrik, 2018; 
Storper, 2018). 
The cross-border corporate network-based organisation of economic activity has thus contributed to 
integration as well as to segregation. Rising territorial (and individual) inequality due to the 
concentration of power, employment and value creation in certain cities and regions in the wealthy 
Global North has coupled with the widespread diffusion of low-tier activities and occupations (but 
increasingly also of higher value-added ones, such as R&D) towards a range of locations in the 
emerging Global South (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007). In the most advanced industrial economies this 
has resulted in a finely-grained, multi-scale, territorial patchwork of diverging real incomes, skill 
demand and supply, and rates of labour force participation: between and within nation-states and, 
within regions, between core and peripheral areas (Iammarino et al., 2018a). Once regions and their 
advantages become unequal in this way, global connectivity ought to be considered in policy making 
amongst the crucial determinants of economic development and territorial equity.   
2.3 The rationale for FDI policy  
Several decades of research on FDI from various theoretical perspectives – e.g. international business 
and management, international economics, economic geography, innovation studies – have explained 
much about the determinants of MNEs’ operations, their business strategies, locational choices and 
proprietary advantages, and about the impact of their investments on host and home economies (e.g. 
Dunning, 1981, 1994, 2001; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Yet, comparatively less research has been 
done on the role of policy in attracting inward FDI (e.g. Brewer, 1993; Oman, 2000; Lowendahl, 2001; 
Ng and Tuan, 2001) or in promoting active internationalisation, or ‘multinationalisation’ of domestic 
firms through outward FDI (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo et al., 2010; Bannò et al., 2014, 2015).  
As far as the rationale behind FDI-attraction policies is concerned, the general expectation – based on 
abundant empirical evidence on the impact of inward FDI (henceforth IFDI) on host economies (see, 
for reviews, Driffield and Taylor, 2000; Blomström et al., 2001; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Moran et 
al., 2005; Haskel et al., 2007) – is that foreign investments will raise employment, exports, or tax 
revenue, and some of the technological and organisational knowledge brought by the foreign 
companies will spill over domestic firms raising productivity and competitiveness (Blomström & 
Kokko, 1998). MNE goals of course differ from those of the host economies: governments seek to spur 
development and growth, whilst MNEs aim to enhance their profitability and competitiveness (Lall, 
2000). Proactive investment policy is thus justified on the basis of the need to address two main types 
of market failure: the first arising from information and coordination asymmetries resulting in 
insufficient FDI; the second stemming from divergence between MNEs’ private interests and host 
economies’ social returns (e.g. Brewer, 1993; Lall, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Blomström and Kokko, 2003; 
De Propris and Driffield, 2006; Bartels and de Crombrugghe, 2009).  
The other, much less studied, side of the coin is the policy support to domestic firms to become 
multinationals. The rationale is based on the evidence on the impact of outward FDI (OFDI) on the 
home economy: the internationalisation of indigenous firms enhances their efficiency, scale of 
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operation, and knowledge transfer (e.g. Feenstra, 2010; Bertrand and Capron, 2015; Cozza et al., 
2015), ultimately contributing to their growth. By entering new and larger markets, firms that pursue 
OFDI tend to become bigger and more productive than purely domestic firms (Helpman et al., 2004; 
Bannò et al., 2014); they also benefit from higher economies of scale and scope that incentivise 
investment in R&D activities (Petit and Sanna-Randaccio, 2000), and are more able to source foreign 
knowledge (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999). Notwithstanding such gains at the individual firm level, if these 
do not compensate for the aggregate loss of value added resulting from the offshoring of activities 
abroad the associated effect could be negative (e.g. Castellani and Pieri, 2016), adversely affecting the 
overall balance of payments and exports and, as shown more recently, domestic employment and 
skills (e.g. Mariotti et al., 2003; Crinò, 2009; Becker et al., 2013; Gagliardi et al., 2015). In a logic 
specular to that for IFDI, herein lies the scope for governments’ intervention to ensure the accruing of 
internationalisation benefits at home (e.g. Rasiah et al., 2010). Interestingly, until very recently the 
evidence on OFDI has been derived primarily from research on large enterprises from advanced 
economies, such as the US, Sweden and Japan (see, for a review, Lipsey, 2004), presuming that firms 
internationalise on the basis of home country-specific comparative advantages. Thus, economies with 
limited location advantages were deemed unlikely to generate competitive firms with ownership 
advantages strong enough to lead to successful internationalisation abroad (Narula & Nguyen, 2011).  
Notwithstanding the rationale behind both IFDI attraction and OFDI promotion in terms of domestic 
firms’ growth, a ‘reversed mercantilist’ view – i.e. the maximisation of inflows with respect to outflows 
– has dominated the encouragement of internationalisation through FDI in advanced economies. The 
increasing importance of worldwide FDI in the last decades has been accompanied by a salient surge 
and diversification of government policy instruments to attract foreign-owned companies in their 
territories by lowering entry barriers and providing a wide range of investment incentives. Attracting 
IFDI has been at the centre of policy attention, involving often various territorial levels of governance 
in a rather indistinct view of location-specific prerogatives for reaping the benefits of globalisation. On 
the OFDI side, conversely, location advantages have been somehow obscured in policy considerations, 
as it has been the importance of multinationality as a stage in firms’ growth (Penrose, 1959); the 
attention has concentrated on privileging export promotion as the main, politically-sustainable, form 
of active internationalisation. In fact, the old big evil alleged in relation to OFDI has to do with 
employment destruction at home, consequent wage depression and unemployment surge (e.g. 
Janoski et al., 2014).  
Thus, both in scholarly circles and in policy making, the impact of OFDI on the home economy has 
generally engendered a rather low appeal, at least in the advanced North of the world; in practice, 
though, the reality tells us a different story. Indeed, not only is offshoring huge and growing, spreading 
worldwide across economies with very different levels of development and connecting their firms, 
increasingly SMEs, through GPNs and GVCs, but governments do negotiate with other governments 
when it comes to the investment abroad of their own national champion companies (e.g. Smith, 
2015), despite the ostensible lack of interest for the territorial roots and consequences of OFDI and 
for the growth potential of SMEs’ active internationalisation.  
The importance of emerging economies’ MNEs in recent years has coupled with the governments in 
some of those countries to promote outward internationalisation through FDI at the same time of 
implementing policies for attractiveness, adopting in some cases distinct subnational approaches. 
These few emerging economic powers – e.g. China, for all – seem to have acknowledged that the 
simplistic host-home and inward-outward dichotomies of the past have become not only obsolete, 
but possibly even treacherous for internal cohesion (e.g. Wei, 2013). The development of active policy 
frameworks to promote the internationalisation of domestic firms in coordination with inward FDI 
promotion – and even as a means to circumvent historic insularity, as for example in the case of Japan 
(e.g. Dunning, 2001) – has been largely an Asian phenomenon, with Western advanced economies 
mostly unable to undergo thoughtful policy learning (e.g. Davies, 2010; Narula & Nguyen, 2011; 
UNCTAD, 2018).  
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The impact of globalisation on development trajectories crucially depends on the capacity of national 
and regional economic systems to implement and govern global-local systemic integration. This 
capacity varies widely across and within the national boundaries of advanced economies. In what 
follows we present and discuss some regional cases of connectivity through FDI in Europe and related 
public policy. 
 
3. Three regional case studies: Southern & Eastern Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
3.1 European regions, economic development and FDI  
The interaction of global and technological forces and regional characteristics generates a geography 
consisting of countries, regions, city-regions and clusters that are at different structural positions in 
the ladder of roles and functions in the international division of labour. Such uneven geography has 
been accentuated by the latest economic and financial crisis. Recent research has shown that, in the 
case of Europe, it is possible to identify four broad regional development clubs each sharing similar 
characteristics and largely corresponding to very high-, high-, medium- and low-income regions. This 
spatial classification – which, combining GDP per capita with other socioeconomic indicators, gives 
rise to further subgrouping – offers a way of generating powerful insights into development and 
distinctive perspectives on regional policy (Iammarino et al., 2018a). Remarkably, although a rigorous 
analysis of how regional development clubs may reflect in terms of FDI connectivity has not yet been 
done, European top-performers regions seem to display a relatively balanced openness in terms of 
inward and outward FDI flows, and an apparent capacity to manage systemic integration between 
intra- and extra-region networks, proving to be comparatively resilient to major economic shocks such 
as the 2008 crisis (Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017). 
To provide a simple illustration of connectivity across European regions, we use here IFDI and OFDI 
flows in the period 2003-2017, as provided by the Financial Times through the fDi Markets database, 
covering cross border greenfield investments1 for all countries and sectors worldwide. The capital 
invested (capex) – expressed in millions of 2005 US dollars – is considered an acceptable proxy of 
regional connectivity through FDI, widely used in the most recent literature (e.g. Burger et al., 2013; 
Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017). Maps 1 and 2 depict the spatial distribution of IFDI and OFDI 
cumulative capital expenditure (2003-17) normalised by the population in the European regions 
(including both intra- and extra-EU FDI).2  
[Maps 1 and 2 about here] 
The spatial agglomeration of global IFDI – represented by differently-coloured deciles – overlaps only 
partially with the traditional European core-periphery economic geography. As also confirmed in Table 
1, reporting the first decile regions, the top attractive locations are UK and Irish regions, some of the 
most advanced city-regions in the Baltic and central and eastern European countries, and a few capital 
cities. However, a number of more peripheral areas in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and in the EU 
Candidate Countries are also relevant hotspots for the attraction of FDI. The geography of cumulative 
OFDI is instead mainly originating from the European core, e.g. the ‘Blue Banana’, and global capital 
cities, as also confirmed in Table 2, showing the top investor regions;3 though substantial investments 
                                                          
1 “fDi Markets tracks crossborder investment in a new physical project or expansion of an existing investment which creates 
new jobs and capital investment. Joint ventures are only included where they lead to a new physical operation. Mergers & 
acquisitions (M&A) and other equity investments are not tracked.” (https://www.fdimarkets.com/faqs/).  
2 Regions are classified according toTerritorial Level 2 of the OECD Regional Classification, which corresponds directly to the 
EUROSTAT Regional Classification (NUTS).  
3 Regional OFDI figures are inflated in certain tax-haven countries, and in capital regions, by a headquarters effect. Outward 
investment “from” Luxembourg, for instance, is an artefact of the location, for tax purposes, of many European corporate 
headquarters in that country. This aspect, and its implications for territorial inequality, would deserve more study also in the 
case of Ireland. See, for instance, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/11/23/2196028/what-the-foreign-direct-investment-
data-tell-us-about-corporate-tax-avoidance/ 
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abroad – particularly following the beginning of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 – involve 
increasingly many less favourite and peripheral regions (Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017).  
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Here we focus on three regional case studies that were selected on the basis of their especially high 
and long-term FDI attractiveness in the European context: Southern & Eastern Ireland (S&E Ireland), 
Scotland and Wales. The latter are two of the twelve UK statistical regions at the NUTS1 level (see, for 
more details on these regions, Comotti et al., 2018). The NUTS equivalent for Ireland is the country as 
a whole; as our focus is subnational, we consider for comparison S&E Ireland, one of two Irish NUTS2 
regions.  
At the time of joining the European Community in 1973, the three regions were all low-income areas, 
with S&E Ireland and Wales roughly similar in terms of GDP per head below the European average, 
and a wealthier Scotland particularly due to its North-Eastern counties. Between 1980 and 2015, 
however, annual GDP per capita growth sharply diverged, ranging from 1.3% in Wales to 3.1% in S&E 
Ireland, with Scotland somehow in the middle with 1.7%. Today significant differences are found both 
between and within the regions with respect to GDP levels: in the European regional development 
clubs’ classification mentioned above, S&E Ireland is included in the high-income club (whilst the other 
NUTS2 Irish region, Border, Midland and Western (BMW), is medium-income); three of the four 
Scottish sub-regions are categorised as medium-income, while North-Eastern Scotland is in the very-
high income club, outperforming the UK average; and of the two sub-regions in Wales, East Wales is 
medium-income, whilst West Wales and The Valleys is among the European low-income regions.  
Although the three regions experienced historically diverse modes of international connectivity,4 they 
share a long-term FDI attractiveness dating back at least to the 1970s – for which they were labelled 
as the “Celtic tiger economies” (Danson et al., 2002) – longstanding internationalisation policies 
through FDI, a geographical location in the north-west of the European continent, and the broad 
institutional foundations of liberal market economies in terms of the variety of capitalism model (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001); they are also broadly comparable in terms of total population (5.4 million in 
Scotland, 3.5 in S&E Ireland and 3.1 in Wales, in 2017). On the other hand, the regions differ with 
respect to their OFDI position: while all three are in the first decile in terms of IFDI (Table 1), only S&E 
Ireland appears among the top investors abroad (Table 2). 
Figure 1 and 2 show FDI flows trends between January 2003 and December 2017. The impact of the 
crisis in 2008 is particularly visible in the case of Wales, which lost its attractiveness especially in terms 
of amount of foreign capital invested; the other two regions, despite experiencing a contraction of 
greenfield IFDI in the immediate aftershock, were able to maintain and even overcome pre-crisis 
values. OFDI, instead, shows similar trends across the three regions, generally diminishing after 2009. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Looking at the distribution by industry over the aggregate period, IFDI in Scotland and Wales appears 
to be highly concentrated in Coal, Oil and Natural Gas (around 30% of total capital invested in Scotland 
and more than 15% in Wales) and in Alternative/Renewable energy (both shares around 30%); 
approximately 10% of foreign capital in Wales is also going into Aerospace. The same sectoral 
concentration characterises OFDI in both UK regions: over 30% of outgoing capitals from Scotland are 
in Coal, Oil and Natural Gas, followed by Financial Services and Alternative/Renewable energy; around 
half of OFDI from Wales originates from Wood products, followed by Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas and 
Alternative/Renewable energy industries. On the contrary, foreign MNE operations in S&E Ireland are 
far more diversified: the largest shares of capital are invested in Software and IT services (over 20%) 
                                                          
4 As said at the beginning, connectivity builds up through a variety of channels, among which labour migration is a 
fundamental one. For instance, for an analysis of how the diaspora of human capital helped high-tech firms of different 
origins to become part of the global division of labour, see Kapur and McHale (2005). 
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and Pharmaceuticals (around 15%), but substantial IFDI is also directed to Semiconductors, Financial 
services and Communications. Around one third of OFDI from the region comes from 
Alternative/Renewable energy and Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas, but considerable internationalisation 
abroad is also experienced by services (e.g. Transportation, Real estate and Software and IT services). 
When thinking in terms of GVCs, the functional dimension is an even more fundamental indicator to 
grasp FDI implications for the regional economy. As evident from Figures 3 and 4, although production-
related activities play a major role in all regions for both IFDI and OFDI, S&E Ireland shows again a 
more diversified functional portfolio in the attraction of foreign MNEs, with significant foreign 
operations in Headquarters, Sales and, notably, R&D functions. Outward investments are behind clear 
transformational processes of the regional industrial structure in all cases, driven by locally-based 
MNEs’ strategies aimed at rationalising production activities, mainly in manufacturing, but in S&E 
Ireland also in services.  
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
3.2 Policies for regional connectivity through FDI 
Whilst the attraction of foreign investors has been a longstanding focus in all three regions, the “Celtic 
tiger economies” show substantial differences in their policy approaches. As all cases offer a wide 
range of policies for broad internationalization, the description here should by no means be deemed 
exhaustive, rather it provides an overview of the main tools and overall national and regional 
strategies, summarised in the Policy Summaries IFDI and OFDI.5  
[Policy Summaries IFDI and OFDI about here] 
Southern & Eastern Ireland  
The attraction of foreign MNEs has had a very prominent role in explaining the Irish highly successful 
economic development (e.g. Barry, 1999; Kirby et al., 2002). The Irish experience – particularly that of 
Dublin and the south and east of the country – has constituted a textbook case for the empirical 
investigation of the effects of export-oriented IFDI on host economies (e.g. Barry and Bradley, 1997), 
and a benchmark for innovative policy learning for both advanced and emerging economies (e.g. 
Buckley and Rouane, 2006; Rios-Morales and Brennan, 2009; Brennan and Verma, 2010).  
S&E Ireland consists of five NUTS3 regions: Dublin, Mid-East, Mid-West, South-Est and South-West. 
Despite the substantial disinvestment experienced during the recent crisis, the region has managed 
to keep its top position as European destination of IFDI; at the same time, OFDI has also increased 
steadily over time. The spatially selective nature of the consequences of the crisis and the increasing 
within-country inequality between S&E Ireland and BMW (Kirby, 2016) have pushed forward the Irish 
regional development agenda and the acknowledgement of the necessity to integrate 
internationalization in territorial policies.6 
Beyond the consistently low rate of taxation, currently a 12.5% tax on corporate profits, offered by 
the Irish government, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) has historically provided a “one-stop 
shop” approach in terms of attracting, facilitating and supporting foreign investors in the country as a 
whole; it also maintains a widespread global presence through 28 international offices in the US, Asia 
Pacific, Europe and Latin America. Most importantly for the purpose here, IDA operates nationally – 
working closely with Enterprise Ireland (EI) and a large number of State Departments, from that of 
Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI), to the Science Foundation Ireland, and the Department of 
Education and Skills – but has a strong regional articulation throughout the two NUTS2 regions, with 
                                                          
5 Both tables have been validated by different institutional actors, including Enterprise Ireland South East, Scottish 
Development International, and researchers at the Cardiff Business School. 
6 See Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (2014), Policy Statement on Foreign Direct Investment in Ireland: 
http://www.enterprise.gov.ie/en/Publications/Policy_Statement_on_Foreign_Direct_Investment_in_Ireland_PDF_689KB_. 
pdf 
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one office for each NUTS3 region in both S&E and BMW (the latter comprising three NUTS3 units). 
Dublin, due to its national capital status and its strong high-technology agglomerations and scientific 
research infrastructure, has been the major attractor of inward FDI, followed by Cork. In its five-year 
plan, Winning: Foreign Direct Investment 2015-2019, the IDA has set targets of FDI attraction at the 
NUTS3 level with the purpose of achieving a greater geographical dispersion of inward productive 
capitals. The explicit aim is “to optimise the potential contribution of FDI to regional economic 
development as part of cohesive regional spatial and economic strategies.” (DJEI, 2014, p. 9). For 
example, one of the tools used for this scope is the property solution, where public investment is 
directed to work with market players to provide a suitable and affordable range of property and site 
choices for foreign investors.  
The IDA operates with sectoral-region-specific approaches. One example is that of the South East IDA, 
which includes the counties of Kilkenny and Waterford. Here, the regional agency especially targets 
financial, technological, and international business services, and high value added manufacturing such 
as pharmaceuticals, which represent the base of the regional comparative advantages. There is also a 
close collaboration with the Institutes of Technology in Waterford and Carlow, both through the 
provision of relevant skills and talent, and their participation in the Technology Gateway clusters – 10 
in S&E Ireland, located in Dublin, Tallaght, Carlow, Waterford, Cork, Limerick and Tralee – that provide 
R&D laboratories and expertise to both local firms and foreign MNEs in advanced technological fields 
(e.g. bio-diagnostic, applied design, pharmaceutical and health care, applied biotechnology).7  
On the OFDI promotion side, Ireland – and especially S&E Ireland, given its exceptionally high share of 
outward investment abroad as seen in Table 2 – is one of the European regions demonstrating full 
awareness of the importance of promoting bi-directional FDI connectivity. However, this is still 
pursued at the national level, mainly through bilateral agreements that reduce regulatory barriers, as 
for instance through double taxation agreements with over 70 countries, which facilitate both IFDI 
and OFDI. Enterprise Ireland is the responsible actor for building and improving the capacity of local 
firms to grow and become international. Although the main action still lies in conventional export-
oriented programmes, there is increasing encouragement and support for firms, including SMEs, 
wishing to invest abroad. In the US, for example, EI-supported firms opened 59 subsidiaries in 2017, 
with a total of approximately 800 Irish-owned MNEs operating across the 50 states, making Ireland 
the 9th largest foreign investor in the US economy.8  
Scotland 
The Scottish government has legislative and executive powers for regional economic development 
devolved by the UK government. As in the case of S&E Ireland, Scotland’s regional strategy has also 
put a lot of emphasis on FDI attraction to create jobs and spur economic growth, becoming an 
international benchmarking for emerging open economies particularly with respect to the electronics 
and life sciences industries (e.g. Ross, 1996; Cooke, 2004; Potter, 2004; Wight et al., 2004). In terms 
of modes of delivery intervention, Scotland stands out within the UK for its stable, integrated and well-
coordinated web of agencies and institutions with clear-cut responsibilities. The publically owned 
development agencies, Scottish Enterprise (SE) and Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE), work 
across different Scottish areas delivering tailored programmes to promote local economic 
development.  
The investment arm, Scottish Development International (SDI), sponsors the Scottish brand 
internationally and Scotland as a destination for high value added foreign investment through 
                                                          
7 Technology Gateway clusters are overall 15, 5 of which located in the BMW region. See 
https://www.technologygateway.ie/network/ 
8 Enterprise Ireland (2018), Irish innovation and investment in America drives record employment and economic growth. 
Americas Enterprise Ireland. Available at: https://americas.enterprise-ireland.com/irish-innovation-investment-u-s-drives-
record-employment-economic-growth-2018/ [Accessed 26 Mar. 2018]. 
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international offices, a close relationship to the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) department, and the 
engagement in global partnerships. Its effectiveness is clearly attested by its leadership in attracting 
more R&D FDI projects than any other UK region in recent years: software and life sciences are the 
main recipient industries (EY, 2017). The industry-targeting strategy aims at mobilising investments 
that can provide larger export markets. In terms of policies and programmes for IFDI, SDI, in close 
collaboration with SE and HIE, delivers policy solutions ranging from tailored business support to 
financial incentives, enterprise zones, regional assistance grants, R&D tax-related incentives and 
grants for the development of new products and processes, and training grants (i.e. Training Plus, for 
any business undertaking a mobile direct investment project based anywhere in Scotland).  
In all programmes offered, from grants to financial incentives, there is no discrimination between 
domestically- and foreign-owned firms, and growing attention has been devoted to high-growth SMEs 
(Mason and Brown, 2012). The Enterprise Areas, for example, scattered across 16 locations around 
the region, offer discounted business rates up to 100%, business tax relief, capital allowances for 
investment in plants, machinery and equipment, multi-level coordination (i.e. among the Scottish 
government, relevant local authorities, agencies and developers) to ensure simplified and rapid 
planning permission, ICT infrastructure, international promotion and marketing, skill and training 
support, with SME-oriented support depending on the specific site-industry. Scottish enterprise areas 
are defined in terms of four broad industry/technological areas (Life sciences, Low carbon/renewable, 
General manufacturing, Growth sectors) and their sub-regional location is driven by the necessity to 
boost intra-regional sectoral networking, to ensure spatial equity and to reflect the priorities of 
industries and the local relative advantages. An example is the low carbon/renewable area, 
concentrated in the north and east of Scotland, which represents the greatest potential for renewable 
energy due to natural resources and land availability. 
Furthermore, the Scottish Investment Bank operates two main equity funds for companies that have 
already set up in Scotland: the Scottish Co-Investment Fund and the Scottish Venture Fund, both of 
which are based on a co-investment model with SDI following a lead investor.  
In terms of OFDI, despite numerous programmes for boosting exports and global awareness, there 
are no specific tools for supporting local firms willing to invest abroad. This is still perceived to be 
outside the scope of the regional development agencies: support to active internationalisation is being 
given to strengthen Scottish-owned firms’ presence on global export markets. However, the 
awareness of the importance of two-way connectivity is growing: the Scottish 2016-2020 trade and 
investment strategy reports the ambition for “a much broader agenda for internationalisation; for 
creating a Global Scotland which seeks to create an environment within Scotland that supports a better 
understanding of international opportunities and a greater appetite and ability to seize them.” (The 
Scottish Government, 2016: 56). The many programmes supporting firms to think globally – for 
instance, assistance to gain market access, support to networks of Scottish firms and individuals 
abroad (e.g. GlobalScot), grants and loans to open new markets and develop new products – represent 
still a grey area where OFDI by domestic firms may be the outcome, although not explicitly planned in 
the support framework. 
Wales  
As Scotland, Wales has a devolved responsibility for regional economic development to the Welsh 
Assembly Government (WAG) by the UK government. Like Scotland, inward FDI has been highly 
relevant, particularly capitalising on the region natural resources such as abundant coal and water, 
with a ‘golden age’ through the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Morris, 1987; Phelps et al., 1998). However, 
Wales has gone through an inversion trend of massive disinvestment over the past three decades, 
losing 171 foreign-owned plants and approximately 31,000 jobs, mainly in manufacturing, in the 1998-
2008 period (WAC, 2012). This has been ascribed to the loss of locational advantages of the region, 
being out-competed by the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, China’s increased 
openness, and the rise of other emerging economies as global players in GPNs and GVCs (NEF, 2013). 
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The policy approach has also been criticised for being too short-term oriented, with “employment at 
any price” type of goals, instead of focussing on sustainable development targets (WAC, 2012). Of the 
three “Celtic tiger” regions compared here, the overall regional strategy relies on traditional economic 
policies maximising inward investment ‘no-matter-what’.  
Wales does offer tools similar to S&E Ireland and Scotland in terms of inward investment attraction, 
such as enterprise zones with financial and regulatory incentives, sectoral approaches targeting high 
value added and knowledge-intensive industries, promotion activities and business support for 
potential and current investors. However, the same tool can differ substantially in its implementation 
across regions: for example, whilst enterprise areas in Scotland are defined at the industry level and 
then as intra-region networks, in Wales they are presented first as spatially distinct areas – often 
referred to as “property-led economic development zones” – built with the main purpose of 
supporting the local economy, and acting as a catalyst for growth elsewhere in Wales, with less 
emphasis on intra-regional sectoral networks.  
As to OFDI, similarly the other two regions Wales is strongly focussed on export-promotion and active 
internalisation of local firms is not explicitly reported as part of the regional strategy. However, unlike 
S&E Ireland, the relevant national government does not fill this role; and unlike Scotland, there is no 
manifest awareness on the side of the regional government. Wales does offer financial aid to potential 
buyers looking to acquire businesses through the Development Bank Wales (DBW), although it does 
not show a particular international focus.  
Overall, Wales lags behind the other two regional cases in institutional stability and strategic 
continuity in the broad domain of local economic development policy. The publicly-owned Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA) was, from 1976 to 2006, the main responsible in this field, and it had a 
well-known brand outside Wales and internationally. In 2006 WDA was abolished, and most of the 
prerogatives for internationalisation were overtaken by the newly formed International Business 
Wales (IBW) within the Department for the Economy and Transport. IBW ceased to exist in 2010, and 
the functions were transferred to the WAG initiative Trade & Invest Wales, exclusively directed to 
attract foreign entrepreneurs or MNEs willing to invest in the region. Support to local firms is instead 
provided by a different agency, Business Wales, located in Llandudno, North Wales, with a strong 
orientation on SMEs and entrepreneurship capacity building. The relative weakness of the formal local 
institutions in embedding foreign MNE activities in the economic fabric of the territory couples with 
that of broader institutional setting, including local labour markets or business networks for the 
diffusion of knowledge and information within the region (Phelps et al., 2003). 
 
4. Towards place-sensitive policies for connectivity 
From the three cases illustrated above, all amongst the most FDI-attractive in Europe, some 
interesting insights can be extracted. Among the three regions, S&E Ireland shows a rather balanced 
connectivity, a more diversified sectoral and functional FDI portfolio on both inwards and outward 
investment, and national and subnational policy approaches carefully coordinated and articulated at 
industry-location levels. Similarly, devolved Scotland’s connectivity approach focuses on defined 
industry/technological areas with the aim of enhancing intra-regional sectoral networking. Although 
in both these regions OFDI promotion, mostly based on support to export, is still pursued at the 
national level, their stable and harmonised local institutions, with clear-cut responsibilities within the 
respective national frameworks, have shown growing awareness of the urgency to tackle the priorities 
of the local relative advantages and ensure spatial equity. The case of Wales – despite sharing with 
Scotland devolution from the UK government – demonstrates how FDI attraction can differ 
substantially in its implementation across regions, even within the same national boundaries. A more 
fragmented regional institutional context has resulted in slacker intra-regional networks, and the 
reliance on old-style maximisation of foreign investment has brought about possibly more but less 
quality employment.  
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In all three regions, both ownership and location advantages of firms show distinct geographical 
profiles, even at the level of city or industrial cluster. This however by no means has diminished the 
role of nation-states and their governments: in fact, the latter become even more essential as fairness 
and equity across territories and people are threatened by globalisation and technological change 
processes, calling for renewed forms of public intervention. 
Connectivity, an essential but somehow disregarded dimension of territorial equity and economic 
development policy, extends far beyond the idea of ‘attractiveness’: connected places are flows’ 
recipients as well as senders. The interactive dynamic capabilities of firms – emphasised in the 
business and management literature as a fundamental requirement for successful entrepreneurship 
(e.g. Zahra et al., 2006; Yiu et al., 2007) – represent the extent to which the firm is able to integrate, 
build and reconfigure internal and external competences and knowledge sources to address rapidly 
changing environments (e.g. Teece et al., 1997; von Tunzelmann and Wang, 2007). By the same token, 
regional interactive dynamic capabilities refer to the overall ability of the local system to engage in 
innovative and organisational processes and ensure institutional change by combining internal and 
external knowledge sources (e.g. Feldman et al., 2005; von Tunzelmann, 2009). Industrial policies, 
especially in advanced economies, can only progress by following an integrated approach of alignment 
between local and global resources, capabilities and skills, taking into account the connectivity 
to/from the region and its interdependence with neighbouring and distant areas and territories 
(Iammarino and McCann, 2013; Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017).  
Place-based policies, and related smart specialisation (RIS3) and constructing regional advantage 
strategies, have increasingly gained momentum especially, but not exclusively, in the EU (e.g. Barca et 
al., 2012; Boschma, 2014; McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). Beyond a few recent exceptions – which, 
in the context of RIS3, emphasise the crucial link between active and passive internationalisation and 
innovation upgrading, and the high dependence of EU regions on inter-regional production and 
innovation networks (Uyarra et al., 2014; Radosevic and Ciampi Stancova, 2018) – the incorporation 
of connectivity through FDI (and not only) among the goals of such policy schemes remains a “missing 
strategy” (Bailey and Driffield, 2007). In illustrating some general regional development policy 
principles, we prefer to use the term ‘place-sensitive’ as it better adapts to multilevel governance, not 
essentially micro-based and bottom up. 
First, place-sensitive industrial policies for connectivity requires territorial differentiation within both 
core and periphery, and across and within regions of the same nation-state. As seen above, the three 
regions historically among the most FDI- attractive and -proactive in Europe have shown markedly 
different evolutionary trajectories and performances, and belong to different development regional 
clubs. Exclusively national, or standardised policy approaches that disregard the nexus sector-
function-space would condemn weaker regional groups to persistent marginalisation. Particularly in 
the case of OFDI, the general practice to design broad support strategies on the basis of effects that 
are, at the aggregate level, neutral or positive, tend to push declining and peripheral regions towards 
relentless downgrading in the global division of labour. The European traditional core-periphery 
dichotomy makes no more sense, and neither it does the excessive reliance on ‘global cities’ as 
gatekeepers as a recipe for diffused growth. Winners and losers turn out to be both core and 
peripheral regions; places within the same nation-state of world-dominating global cities or 
technological centres of excellence are those currently paying the highest charges of globalisation; the 
distribution of benefits and costs of the latter can be skewed even within the same region or city 
(Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017).  
Second, place-sensitive policies for connectivity require strong integration between the ‘silos’ of 
inward and outward FDI, overcoming once and for all the ‘reversed mercantilism’ that has dominated 
so far. On the OFDI side most attention has been devoted to trade, manufacturing and the building of 
territorial competitive advantages, with limited consideration of how to promote openness, stimulate 
– SME and larger domestic – firms’ risk propensity for ‘going global’, and build institutional capacity 
to spur bidirectional connectivity. In addition, little or no attention has been paid to the sectoral and 
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functional features of IFDI versus OFDI into/from the same region. Support to FDI attractiveness 
without careful consideration of what is leaving the region may be the wrong recipe for sustainable 
growth and renewal of local competitive advantages, as the case of Wales seems to indicate. On the 
other hand, as pointed out by Bailey and Driffield (2007), incompatibility of policy goals may arise 
when attracting foreign MNEs to reduce regional unemployment or upgrade skills, without 
simultaneously looking at the promotion of domestic firms’ growth through, among other means, 
offshoring and international outsourcing.  
Financial incentives and access to capital are necessary but not anymore sufficient to support 
connectivity: institutional capacity-building, technical, legal, fiscal and administrative assistance, 
targeted and timely communication and information, provision of specialized skills, all support firms’ 
decisions to invest abroad, helping regions creating absolute advantages – or “knowledge 
monopolies” (Malecki, 2010) – and making them less “provincial” (Gambardella et al., 2009). As the 
examples of S&E Ireland and Scotland have shown, despite OFDI support is still very national, 
awareness of the interdependence between inward and outward global capital flows and intra- and 
extra-region networks is growing, and a more holistic industrial strategy will be decisive to ensure a 
balanced and diversified structural change at the local level (Bailey and Lenihan, 2015). The 
coordination and stability – the ‘thickness’ indicated by Amin and Thrift (1995) – of regional 
development and internationalisation institutions and strategies are fundamental to pursue 
bidirectional openness without threatening the density of relational networks within the region (e.g. 
Cusmano et al., 2010). 
Finally, place-sensitive policies for connectivity entail strong coordination of ‘mission oriented’, top-
down, science-led approaches, and ‘diffusion-oriented’, bottom-up, capacity-building programmes, 
achieving effective compromises and fruitful dialogues between the two main governance views 
depending on the type of region (Iammarino et al., 2017). As anticipated by some scholars, the 
territorial politics and policy for FDI is one area in which the stress on the balance between 
decentralisation and national coordination is toughest (Tewdwr-Jones and Phelps, 2000). 
Top-down approaches – national, European and international – ought to account for the necessary 
conditions for a ‘fairer globalisation’, or rules of law: large MNEs based on intangible assets, exerting 
monopoly powers and control on intellectual property rights, operating in increasingly elusive industry 
boundaries, fleeing taxation and generating growing shares of profits and rents (e.g. The Economist, 
2017)9, undeniably call for concerted and binding regulation for territorial and individual equity to be 
taken seriously (Guy and Iammarino, 2018). But top-down does not tackle the idiosyncratic socio-
economic characteristics of places, i.e. the sufficient conditions for development (e.g. Dopfer et al., 
2004; Pike et al., 2010; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). Here the three regional cases offer rather clear 
evidence. The national coordination role, coupled with the pervasive territorial articulation at the 
NUTS 3 level targeting intra-regional sectoral networks, is one of the most innovative features of the 
Irish internationalisation model (Rios-Morales and Brennan, 2009), though its translation into a best 
practice for OFDI strategies depends on further consolidation (Bailey and Lenihan, 2015). Scotland has 
a similar model of governance based on defined and coordinated responsibility for strengthening  the 
region position in GPNs and GVCs, whilst Wales’ lack of definition and synchronisation of 
accountabilities and tasks across the relevant actors can contribute to a progressive erosion of the 
regional competitive base and ownership advantages of its firms. Moreover, the two UK regions are 
now confronted with the Brexit shock that can severely affect their historical attractiveness and 
overall position in both national and international division of labour. 
This paper aimed at providing a broad-brushed picture of the heterogeneity of place-specific 
development policies in highly FDI attractive regions broadly comparable in their involvement in global 
capital flows, but also very different in terms of development trajectories and economic resilience. 
                                                          
9 https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/01/28/the-retreat-of-the-global-company (last accessed on 
21/08/2018). 
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Further research is in progress to widen regional comparisons within national boundaries, and across 
different varieties of capitalistic systems in Europe. The principles of differentiation, integration and 
coordination discussed above need be enriched with a comprehensive picture of regional 
development policies, with particular attention to innovation and smart specialization strategies, and 
possibly extended to a larger sets of global connectivity indicators. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The growing acknowledgement, in academic research and in public perceptions, that one of the most 
noticeable effects of globalisation and technological change is a rising within-country socio-economic 
inequality has put seriously in question the rather modest achievements of traditional industrial 
policies for internationalisation, still firmly grounded on the maximization of inward FDI and on the 
view that firm ownership and location advantages are shaped by the nation-state of origin or 
destination. 
Interdependence and connectivity of regions, cities and clusters through FDI (and not only) make 
public policy increasingly important to ensure a balanced distribution of benefits and costs of the 
global division of labour through GPNs and GVCs. The role of national governments becomes crucial 
both for ‘looking up’ – i.e. lobbying and exerting pressures to address global negative externalities that 
ought to be corrected through harmonised international regulation with respect, for example, to anti-
trust and financial markets, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, tax regimes and human 
rights – and for ‘looking down’ – i.e. providing the broad framework conditions for the regulation of 
IFDI and OFDI and supporting regional systemic integration, institutional and innovation capacity 
building for development and territorial equity. On the other hand, reconciling firms’ cross-borders 
organisational networks with space-specific assets and institutional structures – i.e. the ‘strategic 
coupling’ process which ultimately drives regional economic development (e.g. Coe et al., 2004; 
Yeung, 2016) – is a task that, to be effective, requires the acclaimed, but rarely attained, multi-level 
governance and coordination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to internationalisation (e.g. 
Torres and Clegg, 2014; Torres, et al., 2016). 
The evolution of the modalities of global productive capital flows has been rapid and drastic, as that 
of its geography. FDI has shifted from greenfield investments to M&A, from capital-intensive to high-
tech manufacturing, from technology-intensive manufacturing to knowledge-intensive services, from 
production activities to R&D, from sectoral to functional specialisation; the number of attractive 
locations and, especially, investors from emerging and developing economies has grown exponentially 
in the 2000s (e.g. Padilla-Pérez and Gomes Nogueira, 2016; Savant, 2017), reversing, possibly once-
and-for-all, the supremacy of the large MNEs from the advanced North as leading investors. A few 
emerging economies, particularly in Asia, have developed active internationalisation policy 
frameworks to support their domestic firms in ‘going global’ (Narula and Nguyen, 2011; UNCTAD, 
2018). As pointed out by the literature on the Asian NICs, outward FDI growth from emerging 
economies mainly reflects the use by domestic firms of the support by their national governments in 
order to upgrade their ownership and location advantages. The most salient recent case is China, 
whose OFDI has grown at an accelerating rate since 2000, as a result of the adoption of a strong 
government intervention – progressively articulated at the subnational level – to encourage domestic 
enterprises to become global (Davies, 2010; Wei, 2013). Despite Europe’s historic openness and 
connectivity, its regions may need to look eastwards for inspiring lessons on regional economic 
development under globalisation. 
 
  
16 
 
References 
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. 1995. Globalisation, institutional ‘thickness’ and the local economy. In Healey, 
P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S., Madani-Pour, A. (eds) Managing Cities: The New Urban 
Context, 91–108, John Wiley, Chichester.  
Athreye, S. and Cantwell, J.A. 2007. Creating competition?: Globalisation and the emergence of new 
technology producers. Research Policy, 36:2, 209-226. 
Athreye, S. and Kapur, S. 2009. Introduction: The internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms—
trends, motivations and strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 18: 2, 209–221. 
Bailey, D. and Driffield, N. 2007. Industrial Policy, FDI and Employment: Still ‘Missing a Strategy’. 
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 7:3-4, 189–211. 
Bailey, D. and Lenihan, H. 2015. A Critical Reflection on Irish Industrial Policy: A Strategic Choice 
Approach. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 22:1, 47-71. 
Baldwin, R.E. 2011. Trade and industrialisation after globalisation's 2nd unbundling: How building and 
joining a supply chain are different and why it matters (No. w17716). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Bannò, M., Piscitello, L. and Varum, C. 2014. The Impact of Public Support on SMEs’ Outward FDI: 
Evidence from Italy. Journal of Small Business Management, 52(1), 22–38.  
Bannò, M., Piscitello, L. and Varum, C. 2015. Determinants of the Internationalization of Regions: The 
Role and Effectiveness of Public Policy Measures. Regional Studies, 49(7), 1208–1222.  
Barca, F., McCann P. and Rodríguez-Pose, A. 2012. The case for regional development intervention: 
place‐based versus place‐neutral approaches. Journal of Regional Science, 52:1, 134-152. 
Barry, F. (Ed.) 1999. Understanding Ireland's Economic Growth. Palgrave, McMillan: London. 
Barry. F. and Bradley, 1997. FDI and trade: the Irish host‐country experience. The Economic Journal, 
107:445, 1798-1811.  
Bartels, F. L. and de Crombrugghe, S. A., 2009. FDI Policy Instruments: Advantages and Disadvantages 
(No. 1). Research and Statistics Branch Working Paper. Vienna. 
Bathelt, H. and Glückler, J. 2014. Institutional change in economic geography, Progress in Human 
Geography, 38:3, 340-363. 
Bathelt, H. and Li, P-F. 2014. Global cluster networks—foreign direct investment flows from Canada 
to China, Journal of Economic Geography, 14:1, 45–71. 
Becker, S. O., Ekholm, K., and Muendler, M. A. 2013. Offshoring and the onshore composition of tasks 
and skills. Journal of International Economics, 90(1), 91-106. 
Bertrand, O., & Capron, L. 2015. Productivity enhancement at home via cross-border acquisitions: The 
roles of learning and contemporaneous domestic investments. Strategic Management Journal, 36, 
640–658. 
Blomström, M. and Kokko, A. 1998. Multinational Corporations and spillovers. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 12(2), 1–31.  
Blomström, M., and Kokko, A. 2003. The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives (NBER 
Working Paper Series No. 9489). NBER Working Paper Series (Vol. 9489). Cambridge, MA.  
Blomström, M., Kokko, A. and Globerman, S. 2001. The determinants of host country spillovers from 
foreign direct investment: a review and synthesis of the literature In: N. Pain (Ed.) Inward 
Investment Technological Change and Growth. The Impact of Multinational Corporations on the 
UK Economy, 34-65, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Boschma, R. 2014. Constructing Regional Advantage and Smart Specialisation: Comparison of Two 
European Policy Concepts. Scienze Regionali, 18, 51-68. 
Boschma, R. and Iammarino, S. 2009. Related variety, trade linkages and regional growth in Italy”, 
Economic Geography, 85, 3, 289-311. 
Brennan, L. and Verma, R. 2010. Inward FDI in Ireland and its policy context. Columbia University 
Academic Commons, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128871 
Brewer, T. L. and Young, S. 1997. Investment incentives and the international agenda. World Economy, 
20(2), 175–198. 
17 
 
Brewer, T. L. 1993. Government Policies, Market Imperfections, and Foreign Direct Investment. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 24(1), 101–120. 
Brown, R.C. 1996. Foreign direct investment and regional economic development: backward 
electronics linkages in Scotland and Singapore. PhD Thesis, University of Strathclyde 
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.285215 
Buckley, P.J. and Rouane, F. 2006. Foreign Direct Investment in Ireland: Policy Implications for 
Emerging Economies, The World Economy, 29:11, 1611-1628. 
Burger, M. J., van der Knaap, B. and Wall, R.S. 2013. Revealed competition for greenfield investments 
between European regions, Journal of Economic Geography, 13:4, 619–648. 
Cantwell, J.A. and Iammarino, S. 2000. Multinational Corporations and the Location of Technological 
Innovation in the UK Regions. Regional Studies, 34, 4, 317-322. 
Castellani, D., and Pieri, F. 2016. Outward Investments and Productivity: Evidence from European 
Regions. Regional Studies, 50(12), 1945–1964.  
Child, J., & Rodrigues, S. B. 2005. The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for Theoretical 
Extension? Management and Organization Review, 1(3), 381–410.  
Coe, N.M., Hess, M., Yeung, H.W.C., Dicken, P. and Henderson, J. 2004. ‘Globalizing’ regional 
development: a global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British 
geographers, 29(4), 468-484. 
Comotti, S., Crescenzi, R. and Iammarino, S. 2018. Scotland and Wales. Foreign Direct Investments: 
regional connectivity through inward and outward flows. Report ESRC-JPI Urban Europe: Industrial 
Network and Institutional Perspectives on Economic Growth and Well-being.  
Cooke, P. 2004. Integrating global knowledge flows for generative growth in Scotland: life-sciences as 
a knowledge economy exemplar. In: OECD, Global Knowledge Flows and Economic Development, 
73-96, OECD, Paris. 
Cozza, C., Rabellotti, R. and Sanfilippo, M. 2015. The impact of outward FDI on the performance of 
Chinese firms. China Economic Review, 36, 42–57. 
Crescenzi, R. and Iammarino, S. 2017. Global investments and regional development trajectories: the 
missing links. Regional Studies, 51(1): 97-115.  
Crinò, R. 2009. Offshoring, multinationals and labour market: a review of the empirical literature. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(2), 197-249. 
Cusmano, L., Mancusi, M.L. and Morrison, A. 2010. Globalization of production and innovation: how 
outsourcing is reshaping an advanced manufacturing area. Regional Studies, 44:3, 235‒252. 
Danson, M., Helinska-Hughes, E. and Hughes, M. 2002. East European Challenges for FDI: A View from 
the Celtic Periphery, Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Faculty of Economics 
and Business, University of Zagreb, 5C, 37-52. 
Davies, K. 2010. Outward FDI from China and its policy context. Columbia FDI Profiles. 
De Propris, L. and Driffield, N. 2006. FDI, clusters and knowledge sourcing. In: C. Pitelis, R. Sugden, J.R. 
Wilson (eds) Clusters and Globalisation: The Development of Urban and Regional Economies, 
chapter 6, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Dopfer, K., Foster, J. and Potts, J. 2004. Micro-meso-macro. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14, 63‒
279. 
Driffield, N. and Taylor, K. 2000. FDI and the labour market: a review of the evidence and policy 
implications, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 16:3, 90–103. 
Driffield, N., Love, J. H. and Taylor, K. 2009. Productivity and labour demand effects of inward and 
outward foreign direct investment on UK industry. The Manchester School, 77(2), 171–203.  
Dunning, J. H. and Lundan, S.M. 2008. Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA. 
Dunning, J. H. 1981. Explaining the international direct investment position of countries: Towards a 
dynamic or developmental approach. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 117(1), 30–64. 
Dunning, J. H. 1994. Re-evaluating the Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment. Transnational 
Corporations, 3, 23–52. 
18 
 
Dunning, J. H. 2001. The Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm of International Production: Past, Present and Future. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 8(2), 173–190.  
Elia, S., Mariotti, I. and Piscitello, L. 2009. The impact of outward FDI on the home country's labour 
demand and skill composition. International Business Review, 18:4, 357-372. 
Ernst & Young 2017. Attractiveness Survey on Scotland. Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/uk/en/issues/business-environment/ey-uk-attractiveness-survey-2017-
scotland 
Ernst, D. and Kim, L. 2002. Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local capability 
formation. Research Policy, 31:8 1417-1429. 
Feenstra, R.C. 2010. Offshoring in the Global Economy: Microeconomic Structure and Macroeconomic 
Implications, MIT Press. 
Feldman, M., Francis, J. and Bercovitz, J. 2010. Creating a Cluster While Building a Firm: Entrepreneurs 
and the Formation of Industrial Clusters. Regional Studies, 39:1, 129-141. 
Fosfuri, A., & Motta, M. 1999. Multinationals Without Advantages. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
101(4), 617. 
Gagliardi, L., Iammarino, S. and Rodriguez-Pose, A., 2015. Outward FDI and the Geography of Jobs: 
Evidence from the UK. CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 10855, September. 
Gambardella, A., Mariani, M. and Torrisi, S. 2009. How ‘provincial’ is your region? Openness and 
regional performance in Europe. Regional Studies, 43:7, 935-947. 
Goos, M., Manning, A. and Salomons, A. 2009. Job Polarization in Europe. American Economic 
Review, 99(2), 58-63. 
Görg, H. and Greenaway, D. 2004. Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from 
Foreign Direct Investment? The World Bank Research Observer, 19:2, 171–197. 
Grindley, P.C. and Teece, D.J. 1997. Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in 
Semiconductors and Electronics. California Management Review, 39:2, 8-41. 
Guy, F. 2009. The Global Environment of Business, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Guy, F. 2015. Globalisation, regionalization and technological change, in D. Archibugi and A. Filippetti, 
The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and Innovation, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Guy, F. and Iammarino, S. 2018. Global monopoly, finance, and regional disparities. Or, the geography 
of Clinton’s tone-deafness. LSE, mimeo. 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D.W. (eds) 2001. Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Haskel, J.E., Pereira, S.C. and Slaughter, M.J. 2007. Does Inward Foreign Direct Investment Boost the 
Productivity of Domestic Firms? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:3, 482-496. 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., & Yeaple, S. 2004. Export versus FDI with Heterogenous Firms. American 
Economic Review, 94, 300–316. 
Iammarino S., McCann P. and Ortega-Argilés R. 2018b. International Business, Cities and 
Competiveness: Recent Trends and Future Challenges. Competitiveness Review, 28: 3, 236-251. 
Iammarino, S. and McCann, P. 2013. Multinationals and Economic Geography. Location, Technology, 
and Innovation. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Iammarino, S., Rodriguez-Pose, A. and Storper, M. 2017. Why regional development matters for 
Europe’s economic future. European Commission WP 07-2017 Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy. 
Iammarino, S., Rodriguez-Pose, A. and Storper M. 2018a. Regional inequality in Europe: evidence, 
theory and policy implications, Journal of Economic Geography, 
https://academic.oup.com/joeg/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeg/lby021/4989323. 
Janoski, T., Luke, D. and Oliver, C. 2014. The Causes of Structural Unemployment: Four Factors that 
Keep People from the Jobs They Deserve. Polity Press, Cambridge MA, USA. 
Javidan, M. and Bowen, D. 2013. The ‘Global Mindset’ of managers: What it is, why it matters, and 
how to develop it. Organizational Dynamics, 43, 145-155. 
19 
 
Jensen, P. D. Ø., and Pedersen, T. 2011. The economic geography of offshoring: the fit between 
activities and local context. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 352-372. 
Kapur, D. and McHale, J. 2005. Sojourns and Software: Internationally Mobile Human Capital and High-
Tech Industry Development in India, Ireland, and Israel. Ch. 9 In A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds.) 
From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China India, 
Ireland and Israel. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kemeny, T. and Rigby, D. 2012. Trading away what kind of jobs? Globalization, trade and tasks in the 
US economy, Review of World Economics, 148:1–16. 
Kirby, P., Gibbons, L. and Cronin, M. 2002. Reinventing Ireland: culture, society, and the global 
economy. Pluto Press: London. 
Kok, S. and Weel, B. 2014. Cities, Tasks, and Skills. Journal of Regional Science, 54: 856-892.  
Lall, S. 2000. FDI and Development : Policy and Research Issues in the Emerging Context (QEH Working 
Paper Series). QEH Working Paper Series. Oxford. 
Li, P-F. and Bathelt, H. 2017. Location strategy in cluster networks. Journal of International Business 
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-017-0088-6 
Lipsey, R.E. 2004. Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment. In: R.E. Baldwin and 
L.A. Winters (eds), Challenges to Globalization: Analyzing the Economics. Ch. 9, University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Lowendahl, H. 2001. A framework for FDI promotion. Transnational Corporations, 10(1), 1–43. 
Luo, Y., Xue, Q., & Han, B. 2010. How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: Experience 
from China. Journal of World Business, 45(1), 68–79. 
Malecki, E.J. 2010. Global knowledge and creativity: new challenges for firms and regions. Regional 
Studies, 44(8), 1033-1052. 
Mariotti, S., Mutinelli and Piscitello, L. 2003. Home country employment and foreign direct 
investment: evidence from the Italian case. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27, 419–431. 
Mason, C. and Brown, R. 2012. Technology‐based firms in Scotland. A Report for Scottish Enterprise. 
Scottish Enterprise. 
McCann, P. and Acs, Z.J. 2010. Globalization: Countries, Cities and Multinationals, Regional 
Studies, 45:1, 17-32. 
McCann, P. and Mudambi, R. 2005. Analytical Differences in the Economics of Geography: The Case of 
the Multinational Firm. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 10, 1857-1876. 
McCann, P. and Ortega-Argilés, R. 2013. Smart Specialization, Regional Growth and Applications to 
European Union Cohesion Policy, Regional Studies, 49:8, 1291-1302. 
Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M. and Blomström, M. (eds) 2005. Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Development? Institute for International Economics, Center for Global Development, Washington 
DC. 
Morris, J.L. 1987. Industrial Restructuring, Foreign Direct Investment, and Uneven Development: The 
Case of Wales. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 19:2, 205-224. 
Mudambi, R. and Venzin, M. 2010. The Strategic Nexus of Offshoring and Outsourcing Decisions. 
Journal of Management Studies, 47:8, 1510-1533. 
Narula, R. and Nguyen, Q. T. K. 2011. Emerging country MNEs and the role of home countries: 
separating fact from irrational expectations (Working Paper Series). UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
(Vol. 21). Reading, UK. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1043-2760(97)84344-5. 
New Economics Foundation (NEF) 2013. Towards a Welsh industrial strategy. Wales TUC. 
Ng, L. F. Y., & Tuan, C. 2001. FDI Promotion Policy in China: Governance and Effectiveness. The World 
Economy, 24(8), 1051–1074. 
Oman, C. 2000. Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment A Study of Competition among 
Governments to Attract FDI. Paris. 
Padilla-Pérez, R. and Gomes Nogueira, C. 2016. Outward FDI from small developing economies: Firm 
level strategies and home-country effects. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 11(4), 693–
714.  
20 
 
Penrose, E. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Petit, M.-L. and Sanna-Randaccio, F. 2000. Endogenous R&D and foreign direct investment in 
international oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(2), 339–367. 
Phelps, N.A., Mackinnon, D., Stone, I. and Braidford, P. 2003. Embedding the Multinationals? 
Institutions and the Development of Overseas Manufacturing Affiliates in Wales and North East 
England. Regional Studies, 37:1, 27-40. 
Phelps, N.A., Lovering, J. and Morgan, K. 1998. Tying the Firm to the Region or Tying the Region to the 
Firm? Early Observations on the Case of LG in South Wales. European Urban and Regional Studies, 
5:2, 119-137. 
Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Tomaney, T. 2017. Shifting horizons in local and regional 
development. Regional Studies, 51:1, 46-57.  
Potter, J. 2004. Policy recommendations and learning models. In: OECD, Global Knowledge Flows and 
Economic Development, 145-180, OECD, Paris. 
Radosevic, S. and Ciampi Stancova, K. C. 2018. Internationalising smart specialisation: Assessment and 
issues in the case of EU new member states. Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 9(1), 263-293. 
Rasiah, R., Gammeltoft, P. and Jiang, Y. 2010. Home government policies for outward FDI from 
emerging economies: lessons from Asia. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5(3/4), 333–
357. 
Rios-Morales, R. and Brennan, L. 2009. Ireland's innovative governmental policies promoting 
internationalisation. Research on International Business and Finance, 23:2, 157-168 
Robert-Nicoud, F. 2008. Offshoring of routine tasks and (de) industrialisation: Threat or opportunity—
And for whom? Journal of Urban Economics, 63(2), 517-535. 
Rodrik, D. 2018. Populism and the economics of globalization. Journal of International Business 
Policy, 1: 12. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-018-0001-4 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Storper, M. 2015. Better Rules or Stronger Communities? On the Social 
Foundations of Institutional Change and Its Economic Effects. Economic Geography, 82:1, 1-25. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. 2013. Do institutions matter for regional development? Regional Studies, 47(7): 
1034-1047. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. 2018. The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 11:1, 189–209. 
Rugman, A.M. 2005. The Regional Multinationals, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Sassen, S. 2001. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. 2nd edn., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Sassen, S. 2009. Cities Today: A New Frontier for Major Developments. The Annals of the American 
Academy for Political and Social Science, 626:1, 53-71. 
Scott, A. and Storper, M. 2003. Regions, Globalization, Development. Regional Studies, 37:6-7,579-
593.  
Smith, D. (2015), Who runs the world? https://www.equatex.com/en/article/who-runs-the-world/ 
(21 Sept. 2015). 
Storper, M. 1995. The Resurgence of Regional Economies, Ten Years Later. European Urban and 
Regional Studies, 2: 3, 191-221. 
Storper, M. 2018.  Separate Worlds? Regional economic divergence and its populist offshoots, Journal 
of Economic Geography, Impulses Section, forthcoming. 
Taylor, C.T. 2000. The Impact of Host Country Government Policy on US Multinational Investment 
Decisions. The World Economy, 23(5), 635–647. 
Taylor, P.J. 2004. World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis, London: Routledge. 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic 
Management Journal, 18:1, 509–533. 
The Scottish Government (2016). Global Scotland: Scotland's Trade and Investment Strategy 2016-
2021. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
21 
 
Torres, M.M. and Clegg, L.J. 2014. Policy effectiveness and “misalignment” with firms’ strategies: 
A study of pro-internationalization incentives. The Multinational Business Review, 22: 4, 329-
350. 
Torres, M.M., Clegg, L.J. and Varum, C.A. 2016. The missing link between awareness and use in the 
uptake of pro-internationalization incentives, International Business Review, 25:2, 495-510. 
Turkina, E. and Van Assche, A. 2018. Global connectedness and local innovation in industrial 
clusters. Journal of International Business Studies, 49: 706. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-
018-0153-9 
Tewdwr-Jones, M. and Phelps, N.A. 2000. Levelling the Uneven Playing Field: Inward Investment, 
Interregional Rivalry and the Planning System. Regional Studies, 34:5, 429-440, 
UNCTAD, various years. World Investment Report, United Nations: New York and Geneva.  
Uyarra, E. and Flanagan, K. 2010. From regional systems of innovation to regions as innovation policy 
spaces. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 2010, 28, 681‒695. 
Uyarra, E., Sörvik, J. and Midtkandal, I. 2014. Inter-regional collaboration in research and innovation 
strategies for smart specialisation (RIS3), JRC Technical Reports, S3 Working Paper Series, No. 06.  
von Tunzelmann, N. and Wang, Q. 2007. Capabilities and Production Theory. Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, 18: 192-211. 
von Tunzelmann, N. 2009. Regional Capabilities and Industrial Regeneration. In M. Farshchi, O. Janne 
and P. McCann (eds), Technological Change and Mature Industrial Regions: Firms, Knowledge and 
Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 11-28. 
Wei, Y.D. 2013. Regional Development in China: States, Globalization and Inequality, Routledge, 
London. 
Welsh Affairs Committee (WAC) 2012. Inward Investment in Wales: Eighth Report of Session 2010-12. 
London: House of Commons. 
Wight, M., Brown, R. and Cannon M. 2004. Global knowledge flows and the issues for Scotland: a 
Scottish Enterprise perspective. In: Global Knowledge Flows and Economic Development, 181-194, 
OECD, Paris. 
Yeung, H.W.C. 2009. Regional development and the competitive dynamics of global production 
networks: an East Asian perspective. Regional Studies, 43(3), 325-351. 
Yeung, H.W.C. 2016. Strategic Coupling: East Asian Industrial Transformation in the New Global 
Economy, Cornell University Press. 
Yiu, D., Lau, C. and Bruton, G. 2007. International venturing by emerging economy firms: the effects 
of firm capabilities, home country networks, and corporate entrepreneurship. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38:4, 519–540. 
Zahra, S.A., Sapienza, H.J. and Davidsson, P. 2006. Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: A 
Review, Model and Research Agenda. Journal of Management Studies, 43:4, 917-955. 
 
 
 
 
Biographical sketch 
Simona Iammarino is Professor of Economic Geography at the Department of Geography & 
Environment of the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK). She was Head of 
Department (2014 – 2017), and she is currently academic member of the LSE Council and Court of 
Governors. She was nominated Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in 2017.  
 
  
22 
 
MAPS, TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Map 1 – IFDI into the European regions: cumulative capital expenditure (Capex 2003-17) 
normalised by regional population (decile distribution) 
 
Source: fDi Market database and Regions & Cities-Eurostat 
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Map 2 – OFDI from the European regions: cumulative capital expenditure (Capex 2003-17), 
normalised by regional population (decile distribution) 
 
Source: fDi Market database and Regions & Cities-Eurostat 
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Table 1 - Cumulative IFDI (capex normalised by regional population 2015) & GDPpc - 
First decile regions, 2003-2017 
NUTS Regions 
FDI/pop 2003-2017 
(US$) 
GDPpc 2016 
(EUROS) 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj                           22,708.91                          35,800  
UKI South East (UK)                           19,736.61                          63,700  
IE02 Southern and Eastern                           19,013.18                          69,900  
RO32 Bucuresti - Ilfov                           14,235.55                          20,500  
LU0 Luxembourg                           13,977.46                          90,700  
UKM Scotland                           13,327.78                          34,000  
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl                           13,073.09                          11,000  
PT18 Alentejo                           12,612.18                          16,900  
CZ01 Praha                           12,281.44                          34,700  
LV006 Riga                           12,116.73                          20,600  
IE01 Border, Midland and Western                           11,689.49                          27,600  
IS002 Rest Country                           11,187.59  54,700* 
BG34 Yugoiztochen                           10,613.68                            5,900  
SK02 Západné Slovensko                           10,328.80                          13,900  
UKL Wales                             9,874.02                          26,200  
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl                             9,775.83                          12,700  
FI1B Uusimaa-Helsinki                             9,712.05                          51,600  
BG41 Yugozapaden                             9,468.89                          10,900  
BG33 Severoiztochen                             9,467.38                            5,400  
EE001 Põhja-Eesti                             9,457.54                          23,300  
LV003 Kurzeme                             8,848.30   9,000**  
ME0 Montenegro                             8,597.78   N/A  
Liechtenstein Liechtenstein                             8,594.98   147,300*/**  
Notes: * GDPpc at the national level; ** data 2015  
Source: author’s elaborations on fDi Market database and Regions & Cities-Eurostat 
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Table 2 - Cumulative OFDI (capex normalised by regional population 2015) & GDPpc 
- First decile regions, 2003-2017 
NUTS Regions 
FDI/pop 2003-2017 
(US$) 
GDPpc 2016 
(EUROS) 
LU0 Luxembourg                         170,550.11                          90,700  
CH06 Central Switzerland                           88,642.05  72,200* 
UKI South East (UK)                           74,127.93                          63,700  
IS001 Capital Region                           54,066.99  54,700* 
FI1B Uusimaa-Helsinki                           51,408.33                          51,600  
CH01 Lake Geneva region                           47,927.36  72,200* 
FR1 Ile-de-France                           47,234.20                          56,000  
NO01 Oslo og Akershus                           43,920.33   75000**  
BE1 Reg. Bruxelles-Cap.                           40,209.93                          63,800  
SE11 Stockholm                           38,880.65                          65,700  
DK01 Hovedstaden                           38,229.68                          62,200  
NL3 West-Nederland                           37,547.03                          46,000  
CH04 Zurich                           36,229.28  72,200* 
SE22 Sydsverige                           35,591.16                          39,400  
CH03 Northwestern Switzerland                           34,897.52  72,200* 
Liechtenstein Liechtenstein                           33,168.55   147,300*/**  
ES21 Pais Vasco                           25,453.27                          31,800  
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid                           25,432.45                          32,800  
AT1 Ostosterreich                           25,187.80                          40,300  
IE02 Southern and Eastern                           24,395.75                          69,900  
NO04 Agder og Rogaland                           20,624.02  58,800** 
Notes: * GDPpc at the national level; ** data 2015  
Source: author’s elaborations on fDi Market database and Regions & Cities-Eurostat 
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Figure 1 – Inward FDI between January 2003 and December 2017. Capex and number of projects 
        
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Source: author’s elaboration on fDi Market database  
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Figure 2 – Outward FDI between January 2003 and December 2017. Capex and number of projects 
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Figure 3 – Inward FDI by GVC function. Capex, 2003-2017 
        
 
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Source: author’s elaboration on fDi Market database  
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Figure 4 – Outward FDI by GVC function. Capex, 2003-2017 
        
 
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Source: author’s elaboration on fDi Market database  
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 Policy Summary IFDI – Selected main policies for Inward FDI by region 
South & Eastern Ireland Scotland Wales 
Inward FDI Policy Actor Timing Inward FDI Policy  Actor Timing Inward FDI Policy Actor Timing 
Dedicated regional offices for 
investment attraction: “One-stop-
shop”-approach with all support 
services integrated under one 
agency, Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA), with regional and 
sub-regional offices (for each of 
the 5 NUTS3 regions). 
IDA    1949 - Enterprise Areas: 4 broad 
industry/technological areas (Life 
sciences, Low carbon/renewable 
North and East, General 
manufacturing, Growth sectors) with 
place-industry targets across 16 top 
locations developed through a 
variety of tools to stimulate business 
opportunities, skills, investments 
and job creation. Various life-cycles 
for the different areas.  
S-Gov, SE, 
SDI, HIE 
1981 - several 
areas developed 
over 35 years 
Inward investment support: 
support for foreign companies 
willing to invest in Wales from 
initial interest to aftercare 
services. 
WDA, IBW, 
WAG 
1975 - 2006 
2006 - 2010 
2011 -  
 
Tax incentives: 12.5% Corporate 
tax, 25% R&D tax credit, zero tax 
rates for foreign dividends. 
 
Irish 
Government  
1998 -
(corp.tax) 
 
Regional Selective Assistance Grant: 
grant schemes offered when the 
project aims directly to 
generate/safeguard employment in 
particular disadvantaged areas in 
Scotland (“assisted areas”). 
SE, HIE 2000 - current Overseas offices: international 
presence through offices – mainly 
located in the US, China and India - 
promoting Wales as investment 
location and hunting potential 
investors. 
WDA, IBW, 
WAG 
1975 - 2006 
2006 - 2010 
2011 -  
 
Technology Gateways: sector-
specific clusters of firms and 
research institutes providing 
research facilities, materials, 
equipment, expertise in advanced 
technology fields. 10 located in 
S&E Ireland. 
EI, IoT, EU 2008 Account management: assistance 
for foreign investing companies to 
ensure they obtain aftercare 
services. 
SE, HIE, SDI 2001 Inward investment marketing: 
general support and assistance, 
securing talent/skills, advice on 
land policy.  
WDA, IBW, 
WAG 
2006 - 2010 
Skillnets: financial support 
provided to networks of firms 
(domestic and foreign) from the 
same sector or geographical 
location with similar current and 
future skill needs; subsidizing 
training of management, 
employees and active job-seekers 
for upskilling and/or critical areas. 
  
Skillnets 1999 Smart: Scotland: financial support 
for feasibility studies and 
prospective R&D projects that can 
have commercial application and 
potential global market. Targeted 
particularly on SMEs, university spin-
outs or individuals. 
SE 1999 Enterprise zones: 8 geographical 
areas providing specific financial 
incentives, accelerated planning, 
sectoral networks, university 
research linkages, hard and soft 
infrastructure. The areas are 
specialised in specific industries.  
WAG 2011 - 
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Southern and Eastern Ireland Scotland  Wales 
Outward FDI/ 
Internationalisation policy 
Actor Timing Outward FDI/ 
Internationalisation policy 
Actor Timing Outward FDI/ 
Internationalisation policy 
Actor Timing 
Double Taxation Treaties: tax and 
regulatory barriers to FDI flows 
between countries removed through 
international agreements, such as 
double taxation treaties. 
Agreements concern income tax, 
corporation tax and capital gains tax. 
 
Irish 
Government 
Continuously 
updated, 73 
in 2017 
Readiness to internationalise: 
modules aimed at firms at different 
stages of internationalisation. 
Offers: i) preparation ii) developing 
international strategy iii) mentoring 
iv) overseas market support v) 
exhibitions, visits and learning 
fieldtrips. 
SDI 2002 - 
current 
Financial assistance for business 
acquisition: financial and business 
support to domestic firms for local 
or international acquisitions. Flexible 
loans and equity. 
DBW 2017 - 
current 
Tailored support: support provided 
by EI tailored to local firms' level of 
development and needs. This allows 
for a great diversity and flexibility of 
the support offered, also in terms of 
outward investment and active 
internationalisation. 
 
EI 1998 - 
current 
GlobalScot: global network of 
Scottish firms and successful 
businessmen abroad providing 
assistance and advice to firms 
planning to export/invest. 
Global Scot,  
SE  
2001 – 
current 
Export Assist Programme: 
promotion of and support to 
internationalisation of businesses in 
pre-determined industries, with the 
aim to increase competitiveness in 
global markets, particularly of SMEs.  
WAG, 
EU  
2009 - 2015 
Enterprise Ireland’s global offices: 
access to incubators, local sectoral 
and market knowledge, and 
intermediation with 
buyers/suppliers/partners through 
32 offices worldwide. Close 
collaboration with IDA global offices. 
 
EI 1999 - 
current 
International Strategy Development 
Programme: aiming to increase the 
number of Scottish companies 
globally through the provision of 
external consultants for 20 days to 
help developing international 
strategy and action plan. 
SDI 2001 – 
current  
Trade and internationalisation 
support teams: provided by the 
Welsh Development Agency.  After 
the abolishment in 2006, overall 
funding for this action was cut by 
66%. 
WDA Until 2006  
Internationalisation Grant: financial 
support to the cost of researching 
and exploring new international 
business opportunities. Ceased to 
exist in 2018. 
EI 2004 – 2018 Specific overseas strategies: 
presence and diplomatic 
collaboration to increase FDI from 
emerging and established markets, 
and simultaneously working to 
increase access to these markets for 
domestic traders.   
S.Gov, SDI 2006 - 
current 
Overseas offices: multifunctional 
offices in strategic locations abroad 
aiming to promote attractiveness (I-
FDI); in addition they support Welsh 
exports, providing market 
information to domestic firms and 
promoting tourism.  
WDA, 
IBW, 
WAG 
1975 - 2006 
2006 - 2010 
2011 -  
 
